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THE SPONSORING OF LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME
HOUSING THROUGH LOCAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
HAVING NONPROFIT CORPORATE GENERAL PARTNERS
INTRODUCTION
The National Housing Act of 1949 called for "the early realiza-
tion . . . of a decent home and suitable living environment for every
American family."' Although some progress has been made toward this
goal,' there remains a continuing need to provide satisfactory housing,
at affordable rents, to lower-income families.' In 1967, the President's
Committee on Urban Housing (the Kaiser Committee) was given the
task of quantifying the national housing need and making recom-
mendations for the fulfillment of two basic housing goals.' The first
goal was to accelerate "the production and rehabilitation of decent
housing for the poor."' The second was to maximize "private participa-
tion in developing, sponsoring, and managing federally-subsidized
housing."
The Committee determined that satisfaction of the national hous-
ing need in the seventies would require at least twenty-six million new
and rehabilitated units; of these, the Committee recommended that six
to eight million be federally-subsidized dwellings for families unable
to compete in the private housing market.? The Committee also deter-
mined that the traditional sources of housing production would be in-
adequate to meet these goals.' A survey of business attitudes prepared
for the Kaiser Committee indicated that American industry had not
been sufficiently attracted to the low- and moderate-income housing
Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
2 Kristof, Urban Housing Needs Through the 1980's: An Analysis and Projection,
Research Rep. No. 10, xi, 4 (1968) (prepared for the Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems)
[hereinafter cited as Kristof]. Much of the progress is attributable to the efforts of non-
profit sponsors of low- and moderate-income housing, who have participated in federally-
assisted programs. As of June, 1967, 62,000 units of § 221(d) (3) below-market-interest-
rate housing were either completed or under construction. Approximately one-half of these
units were produced by profit-motivated sponsors and one-half by nonprofit and coopera-
tive sponsors. Under the § 202 program for elderly housing, 23,000 units were sponsored
by nonprofit corporations. Report of the President's Comm. on Urban Housing, A Decent
Home 64 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A Decent Home.]
8 Kristof, supra note 2, at xiv.
4 Appointed by the President in June, 1967, the Kaiser Committee was assigned the
task of "find[ing] a way to harness the productive power of America . . . to the most
pressing unfulfilled need of our society. That need is to provide the basic necessities of a
decent home and healthy surroundings for every American family now imprisoned in the
squalor of the slums." A Decent Home, supra note 2, at 1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 8. The report noted that since the beginning of federal housing subsidy pro-
grams in the 1930's, only 800,000 subsidized units had been built; the annual rate of
production at the time of the report was approximately 50,000 units. Thus the report
recommended a twelve to fifteen hundred percent increase in annual average production
of federally subsidized units. Id. at 9.
8 Id. at 47.
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field.° The primary reasons for this disinclination appeared to be (1)
the uncompetitively low rate of return on housing investment; and
(2) the lack of experience on the part of private industry in the man-
agement of housing for low- and moderate-income families, and the
inability of private industry to devote "substantial time to occasional
housing ventures.s'D
In order to increase the attractiveness of private participation; the
Kaiser Committee recommended the creation of a new instrument
of private enterprise: the National Housing Partnership (NHP). As
conceived by the Committee, and later enacted by Congress in the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 1' the NHP is a limited
partnership consisting of a corporate general partner (the National
Corporation for Housing Partnerships)," and investors who are stock-
holders in the corporation or limited partners in the limited partnership,
or both." The function of NHP is to sponsor low- and moderate-
income housing by entering into limited partnerships with local de-
velopers and nonprofit groups." NHP participates in these local limited
partnerships as a limited partner and it may also participate as a gen-
eral partner. However, it usually obtains the tax benefits distributable
to its national investors by participating as a limited partner."
In addition to creating NHP, Congress recognized the possibility
of using purely local limited partnerships, without NHP participation,
but employing the same tax incentives, in order to further the same
housing goals." However, in contrast to the detailed provisions for the
design of NHP, the Act prescribes no formula for the structure of
purely local partnerships having no NHP participation. The legislation
indicates only that the creation of NHP in no way precludes the crea-
tion of other partnerships to achieve the same congressional objec-
tives,17 and sponsors are presumably free to organize local partnerships
in accordance with the laws of their own jurisdictions. Both the local
limited partnerships and the NHP are designed to overcome the private
investors' objections to participation in the development of low- and
moderate-income housing. Inducement is provided by (1) increasing
9 Id. at 85.
10 Message of President Johnson, The Crisis of the Cities, Feb. 1968, in A Decent
Home, supra note 2, at 86.
11 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 §§ 901-11, 42 U.S.C. 11 3931-41
(1970).
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 3933(a), 3936(b)(2), 3937(d) (1970).
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 3933(c), 3937(f),(g) (1970).
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 3936(b)(1),(2),(4),(5) (1970),
12 See Burgess & Friedberg, NHP--A New Opportunity For Housing, 39 Geo, Wash.
L. Rev. 870, 884-87 (1971).
10 42 U.S.C. § 3932(c) (1970) provides, in relevant part:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preclude private persons from
creating other corporations and organizing other partnerships, joint ventures, or
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the investors' return through use of the limited partnership form, which
allows depreciation losses to be "passed through" to each investor;
and (2) permitting investors to assume a passive position by the del-
egation of management responsibility to the general partner?'
Thus, as a result of the Act, local investors and organizations,
including nonprofit corporations, can sponsor federally-assisted hous-
ing by either joining with NHP or organizing purely local partnership
syndicates. For several reasons, many potential local sponsors may
find use of the purely local limited partnership to be a more attractive
device for developing publicly-assisted housing. Some sponsors may
feel that involvement with NHP creates a layer of remote bureaucracy
and reduces local control; or that NHP involvement is unnecessary
since talent and capital are locally available; or that such a relation-
ship would bestow upon the national investors benefits which are
otherwise locally distributable. For such local sponsors who do not
desire NHP involvement, a local limited partnership having a non-
profit corporate general partner and profit-motivated limited partners
seems to satisfy the aims of both the nonprofit and profit motivated
participants and to implement the congressional objectives expressed
in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. This vehicle
offers many of the advantages derivable from NHP participation; but
it also presents certain disadvantages not present with NHP partici-
pation.
The advantage for the nonprofit corporate general partner wish-
ing to sponsor federally-assisted housing is the availability of addi-
tional capital derived from private limited-partner investors?" While
18 See A Decent Home, supra note 2, at 86. The tax benefits which the owners of
new rental residential property receive are of two types. Some were allowed prior to the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 and were retained for all new rental residential property. Others
were enacted in the Tax Reform Act as incentives for participation in Iow- and moderate-
income housing. Among the changes made were (1) limiting the use of double declining
balance and sum of the years' digits depreciation methods solely to new residential rental
property, Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 167(j)(2)(B); (2) reducing the depreciation allow-
ances for commercial, industrial, and used residential uses, id. at § 167(j)(1),(4),(5);
(3) requiring 100% recapture of post-1969 excess depreciation as ordinary income rather
than capital gains for real property other than residential rental property; and (4) allow-
ing residential rental real property other than certain federally-assisted housing to
continue to be eligible in order to avoid excess recapture, but only at 1% per month
when held after 100 full months, id. at § 1250(a)(1)(C)(iii).
Additional tax benefits for those sponsoring new federally-assisted housing under
§ 236 of the National Housing Act involve (1) permitting recapture reduction for post-
1969 excess depreciation under the pre-1969 method of a 1% reduction per month after
the first 20 full months holding period, id. at § 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii); a I0 year holding
period thus fully avoids recapture of depredation as ordinary income; and (2) encourag-
ing developers to sell the project to tenants and to reinvest in other federally-assisted
projects. Section 1039 provides that no gain will be recognized to a taxpayer-sponsor on
a qualified sale to tenants if within the allowed reinvestment period such sale proceeds
are fully reinvested in other federally-assisted low-income housing, id. at § 1039. See
Ritter & Sunley, Real Estate & Tax Reform: An Analysis and Evaluation of the Real
Estate Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 30 Md. L. Rev. 5 (1970).
19 A Decent Home, supra note 2, at 91.
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nonprofit sponsors have proved to be significant and successful pro-
ducers of housing for low- and moderate-income families without using
the partnership device," they have frequently been undercapitalized'
and unable to provide either pre-construction project development
funds or community facilities and social services. The tenant coun-
selling; child care and other ancillary community facilities which non-
profit groups wish to provide are made possible by the additional
capital from private investors. As a tax-exempt organization, the non-
profit corporation does not benefit from the tax shelters generated by
a large rental project." Consequently, part of the benefits which the
corporation makes available to its limited partners would be valueless
if retained by the former. Moreover, as a general partner, the nonprofit
corporation maintains control of the project management."
For the private investor, the limited partnership is an attractive
investment form, permitting him, as a limited partner, to confine his
liability to the amount of his contribution. His liability will remain
limited as long as he does not participate in the control of the busi-
ness." The limitation on liability is essential for the purpose of mar-
keting the interests on a competitive basis with other portfolio invest-
ments. In addition, limited partners enjoy a passive position which
requires little participation beyond the initial investment." Unlike the
corporate form,26 the limited partnership permits full distribution of
profits to the partners without incurring double taxation. 27 Losses may
similarly be "passed through" to the partners to offset other income."
Thus, the nontax corporate advantages and the tax advantages of a
noncorporate form make the limited partnership form desirable as
a vehicle for investment in a federally-subsidized housing development.
Nonetheless, there may be disadvantages in not joining with the
NHP. Without NHP participation, a local limited partnership may
risk increased exposure to the dangers which the enabling legislation
20 See note 2 supra.
21 See A Decent Home, supra note 2, at 91.
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1 (1971) requires exempt organizations to file only an infor-
mational return.
28 Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 7, limited partners may not take part
in the control of the business without losing their limited liability status.
24 Id. ft 7, 17(1).
25 Id. § 7.
28 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11 imposes a tax on corporate income; § 1 imposes a
tax on individual income, and § 61(a) (7) includes dividends in individual income. Hence
the income of a corporation is taxed both at the corporate level and when distributed to
stockholders.
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 701 provides that partnerships are not subject to the
income tax and that only the partners as individuals have tax liability. Id. at § 704
permits the partnership losses to pass through to the individual partner. The owners of an
FHA-insured project may take depreciation deductions for the entire cost of the project
even though 90% is financed with borrowed money. Id. at ft 167(j),(k). See also Burgess
& Friedberg, NHT—A New Opportunity for Housing, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 870, 876
(1971).
28 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 704.
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eliminated with respect to NHP. Indeed, fundamental questions affect-
ing the creation and viability of the local limited partnership having
a nonprofit corporate general partner were left unanswered by the
congressional legislation. The principal issues are (1) the capacity of
a nonprofit corporation to become a partner; (2) the effect which
such participation has on the nonprofit corporation's federal income
tax exemption; and (3) the classification of the limited partnership
for federal income tax purposes.
In respect to the NHP, Congress explicitly authorized the Na-
tional Corporation for Housing Partnerships to operate as the general
partner of the partnership and assured that the tax savings would pass
through to individual investors 80 However, no such specific authoriza-
tion or assurance appears with respect to local partnerships.' Indeed,
it is questionable whether Congress could enter this area of local law.
Furthermore, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 makes
no mention of the status of the tax exemption of a nonprofit corpora-
tion when such a corporation participates in a partnership which gen-
erates benefits for the limited partners.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze these problems in order
to determine the feasibility of using a local limited partnership to
achieve the national housing objectives expressed in the Housing and
Urban Development Act. The comment concludes that:
1. In an increasing number of jurisdictions there is a present
trend, reversing the common law prohibition; toward per-
mitting corporations, including nonprofit corporations, to
join partnerships. For example, in Massachusetts and in
those states which have adopted the relevant provision
of the ABA-ALI Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, non-
profit corporations are authorized to become partners.
2. Based upon the purpose and practices of nonprofit cor-
porations in local limited partnerships which sponsor fed-
erally-assisted housing, and the requirements of the In-
ternal Revenue Code and the relevant case law, strong
arguments can be made for a federal income tax exemp-
tion for such corporations. The arguments are twofold:
the provision of low- and moderate-income housing is a
function warranting an exemption; and the benefits ac-
cruing to the investing partners are merely incidental to
that exempt function.
3. A local limited partnership having a nonprofit corporate
general partner is able to qualify as a partnership for the
purpose of using the same tax advantages used by the
29 42 U.S.C. § 3937(d) (1970).
80 See A Decent Home, supra note 2, at 86.
31 42 U.S.C. 11 3932(c) (1970) is silent on the question of tax benefits to investors in
non-NHP partnerships.
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NHP in low- and moderate-income housing ventures.
The major obstacle which must be overcome in achiev-
ing partnership tax classification is not the test articu-
lated in the Treasury Regulations, but a series of guide-
lines used by the Individual Income Tax Rulings Branch.
I. CORPORATE PARTICIPATION IN PARTNERSHIPS
The first consideration in determining the feasibility of using local
limited partnerships to achieve national housing objectives is whether
a nonprofit corporation can be a general partner in a limited partner-
ship. Both partnership and corporation law bear on the problem.
Partnership law is relevant insofar as it relates to those eligible to
become partners, while corporation law determines whether corpora-
tions have the power to join partnerships. In jurisdictions which have
adopted both the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA)," corporations appear eligible to
become both general and limited partners. Both acts require only that
partners be "persons!"aa Since corporations are considered persons,"
they appear to be eligible for partnership participation under the uni-
form acts."
However, corporate power to enter partnerships is primarily de-
termined by corporation, not partnership law." Under the common
law; the courts generally adhered to a strict interpretation of corporate
power and purposes, finding that corporate membership in partnerships
was ultra vires, unless the corporate enabling statute or the corporate
charter provided explicit authorization." In Massachusetts, for exam-
ple, it was early held, in Whittenton Mills v. Upton," that a cotton
manufacturing company lacked power to enter a partnership because
there existed no express authorization for the corporation to enter a
partnership under either the corporate enabling act or the corporate
charter 3° Absent such authorization, the court stated, the common
law prohibition against the corporate partner would control."'
The court justified the prohibition on the ground that the mutual
agency relationship of partners, which permits each partner to bind
32 Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted both the UPA and
the ULPA. The states which have adopted only the UPA are Delaware, Kentucky, Oregon
and Wyoming. Those which have adopted only the ULPA are Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas and
Mississippi. New Hampshire, Alabama, Louisiana, and Maine have adopted neither.
6 Uniform Laws Ann. 5, 25 (Master ed. Supp. 1971).
8B Uniform Partnership Act § 6(1); Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 1.
34 Uniform Partnership Act § 2.
au This view has found judicial support , in Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 155
Tex. 612, 616, 291 S.W.2d 312, 315 (1956).
39 6 Uniform Laws Ann., Uniform Partnership Act § 6(1), Comment 1 (Master ed.
1969).
87 See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 917, 920 (1958).
38 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 582 (1858).
39 Id. at 597.
40 Id.
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the other, conflicts with the statutory requirement that a corporation
be controlled by its board of directors. 41. This mutual agency creates
the danger that the corporate assets may be exposed to risks which
the stockholders had not contemplated at the time of their invest-
ment." For example, the partnership might choose to enter a new
area of commercial activity involving greater risks than that in which
the corporate stockholders initially sought to invest. Whittenton en-
gendered a series of decisions which followed the strict prohibitory
rule." In other jurisdictions, the mutual agency argument and public
policy have been emphasized in reaching the same conclusion."
The common law prohibition against corporate participation in
partnerships is a manifestation of the suspicion and antipathy which
greeted the expanded use of the corporate form in the last century. 45
Corporate activity has traditionally been carefully limited. Indeed,
"[u]ntil comparatively recent times . . . corporations were burdened
with sharp statutory restrictions on their longevity and size." 4° Fre-
quently, corporations were limited by fixed terms of existence and
ceilings on capital 4 7
 Today; however, there is no longer a public pol-
icy or a general legislative intent to unduly restrict implied corporate
powers, "provided these implied powers are not opposed to positive
law, and are necessary or convenient in the furtherance of [the cor-
poration's] express powers."'" The popularity of the corporate form is
evidenced by the fact that most of the business in the United States
in done by corporations." The continuously expanding use and wide
acceptance of the corporate form renders the common law prohibition
against the corporate partner archaic and impractical;" the rule un-
necessarily restricts corporate activity.' The arguments of mutual
agency and "uncontemplated risk to capital" are clearly untenable
today, as corporations frequently appoint general agents who have the
authority to bind the corporation and to expose corporate assets to
risks." It is incongruous to continue to disapprove of corporate mem-
41
 Id, at 596.
42
 Id. at 598.
48 See e.g., Williams v. Johnson, 208 Mass. 544, 552, 95 N.E. 90, 93 (1911); Hosher-
Platt Co. v. Miller, 238 Mass. 518, 523, 131 N.E. 310, 313 (1921) ; Rosenblum v. Spring-
field Produce Brokerage Co., 243 Mass. 111, 115-16, 137 N.E. 357, 359-60 (1922).
44 See People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 623-24, 24 N.E. 834, 840
(Sup. Ct. 1890) ; Sabine Tram Co. v. Bancroft, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 174-75, 40 S.W.
837, 839 (1897).
45 See Rowley, The Corporate Partner, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 769, 777 (1930) [hereinafter
cited as Rowley].
48 1 CCH Corp. L. Guide 11 101 (1971).
47 See Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S.
517,549-54 (1933).
48 See Rowley, supra note 45, at 777-78.
49 1 CCH Corp. L. Guide 11 102 (1971).
50 See Rowley, supra note 45, at 777.
51 See generally Rowley, note 45 supra.
62 Id. at 771-73.
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bership in partnerships while permitting the same risks to arise else-
where under the corporate form.
Even assuming some logical relevance of the common law rule
to a general partnership, the validity of applying the rule to a limited
partnership having a nonprofit corporation as the sole general partner
is difficult to discern. As one noted commentator has observed, "[t]he
reason for the rule preventing a corporation from forming a partner-
ship . . . namely delegation of authority, does not apply to a partner-
ship agreement by which the entire management of the business is
reserved to the corporation." 53 A limited partnership with a nonprofit
corporate general partner presents precisely such a situation. No mu-
tual agency would bind the corporation, since the limited partners are
denied participation. in the control of the business." The nonprofit
corporation would have control of its own assets as well as those of
the limited partnership. Thus the limited partners could not expose
the assets of either the corporation or the partnership to risks without
acting in contravention of the partnership agreement and the ULPA.
Realizing that the reasons for the common law rule are outmoded,
courts and legislatures in many jurisdictions have either eroded or
abrogated the rule. For example, a limited partnership exception to
the strict rule was recognized in Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow.°
In that case the Supreme Court of Texas ordered the Secretary of
State to file the certificate of a limited partnership, having a corporate
limited partner, which was intended to serve as trustee for a number
of trusts. The charter of the corporation included authorization to
serve as a trustee under any lawful express trust. The court held that
where the Corporation Code permitted a corporation to act as a trustee,
and where this power was granted by the corporate charter, the cor-
poration could enter a limited partnership dealing with trusts." The
court's rationale acknowledged that the assets of a corporation in a
limited partnership are not exposed to uncontemplated risks created
by the mutual agency relationship; since the corporation maintains
control of its assets," and since the corporate directors continue to
manage the corporation's business affairs, as required by law. Although
the case concerned only the power of the corporation to serve as a
limited and not a general partner, it indicates a judicial willingness to
regard the traditional common law prohibition differently in a limited
partnership situation. The important aspect of the decision is not that
the corporation was permitted to act as a limited partner; rather, it
is that the court recognized the validity of a corporation's participa-
tion in a situation lacking the mutual agency which exists in a general
partnership.
53 H. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations 236 (1946),
64 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 7.
55 155 Tex. 612, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956).
53 Id. at 615-16, 291 S.W.2d at 314-15.
57 Id. at 614, 291 S.W.2d at 314.
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Iri many other jurisdictions, perhaps in response to a desire for
consistency with the uniform partnership acts and because of an in-
creased respect for corporations generally, the change has occurred
by statute. The Model Business Corporation Act, adopted in a num-
ber of jurisdictions, expressly authorizes the participation of business
corporations in partnerships. 58 Similarly, the New Yodel' and Dela-
ware" corporation statutes provide that corporations may become
partners. Thus, where the uniform partnership acts have been adopted
and where statutory or charter authority exists; business corporations
clearly may become partners.'
Although there appears to be no case regarding the question of
the participation of nonprofit corporations in partnerships, the argu-
ments for and against such participation are the same as those regard-
ing participation by business corporations. The recent statutory trend
has been toward permitting nonprofit corporations the same powers
as business corporations, including the right to enter partnerships."
In jurisdictions which have either wholly or in relevant part adopted
the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, corporations organized under
its authority are given the same express power to enter partnerships"
as that provided to corporations organized under the Model Business
Corporation Act. Neither of these statutes distinguishes between the
58
 ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act §§ 4(g),(p) (rev. 1969). The Act has
been adopted substantially in full by the following states: Wisconsin (1951), Oregon
(1953), District of Columbia (1954), Texas (1955), Virginia (1956), North Dakota (1957),
Alaska (1957), Colorado (1958), Iowa (1959), Wyoming (1961), Utah (1962), Mississippi
(1962), Nebraska (1963), Arkansas (1965), South Dakota (1965), and Washington
(1965). 1 CCH Corp. L. Guide 1 111 (1965).
59 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(a) (15) (McKinney 1961).
88
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(11) (1969).
In The CCH Corporation Law Guide indicates that the business corporation statutes
in the following thirty-two jurisdictions permit corporations to enter partnerships: Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota,- Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. 1 CCH Corp. L. Guide § 649 (1971).
62 ABA-ALI Model Nonprofit Corporation Act 5(g) (1964 ed.) The Model Non-
profit Corporation Act was drafted in 1952, revised in 1957 and again in 1964 by the
Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
of the American Bar Association. The revisions were made for the purpose of "bringing
the text still more closely in accord with the Model Business Corporation Act." ABA-ALI
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act Practice Handbook viii (1964). The expected result
is that decisions and commentaries under the Model Business Corporation Act will be
helpful in interpreting and applying the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. This Act has
been adopted in Wisconsin (1953), Alabama (1955), North Carolina (1956), Virginia
(1956), Nebraska (1959), and the District of Columbia (1962). Id. at x. In addition, the
statutes of Illinois, Missouri and Ohio are "similar to the Model Act in substantial
respects." Id.
63 ABA-ALI Model Nonprofit Corporation Act § 5(g) (1964 ed.) provides that
corporations have the power to "purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise
acquire, own, hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of,
and otherwise use and deal in and with ... partnerships . • • ."
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powers to join general or limited partnerships. In these jurisdictions
the common law arguments against the corporate partner apparently
have been overcome by the practical need for flexibility in corporate
activity.
In Massachusetts the W hittenton rule has finally been statutorily
abrogated. In 1969 the Legislature amended the Business Corpora-
tion Act to permit business corporations to become partners if au-
thorized to do so by their articles of organization." Two years later,
nonprofit corporations in Massachusetts were also permitted to include
in their articles of organization a provision authorizing partnership
membership." Where, as in Massachusetts, the nonprofit and business
corporation statutes are not simultaneously amended, nonprofit cor-
porations desiring to participate in local housing syndicates may seek
to circumvent the problem by forming business corporation subsid-
iaries. This technique was one used in Massachusetts before the recent
amendment permitting nonprofit corporate partners.°° However, in
addition to the confusion and the unnecessary organizational problems
created, this situation may seriously compound the question of the non-
profit parent corporation's federal income tax exemption—another fun-
damental question which must be resolved before a nonprofit corpora-
tion enters a local partnership.
II. FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTION
Once the question concerning the capacity of a nonprofit corpo-
ration to participate in a limited partnership has been affirmatively
resolved, the feasibility of such participation under the federal tax
laws must be determined. The initial inquiry is whether a nonprofit
corporation can retain its tax exempt status while sponsoring low- and
moderate-income housing through a limited partnership. The basis for
the tax exempt status of nonprofit corporations is found in Sections
501(c) (3) and (4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Under
these sections an organization is exempted from federal income taxa-
tion if it is operated "exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or
educational purposes ...747 or "exclusively for the promotion of social
64
 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 1565, § 9A as amended, Acts & Resolves of 1969, ch. 392,
§ 7 provides that "to the extent authorized by its articles of organization, a corporation
may be a partner in any business enterprises which said corporation would have power to
conduct by itself."
65 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 180, § 6, as amended by Acts & Resolves of 1971,
ch. 819, § 6.
60 Letter from Fred R. Becker, Ropes and Gray, Boston, Massachusetts to Paul F.
McDonough, March 1, 1972 [on file at the office of the Boston College Industrial and
Commercial Law Review].
67 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, I 501(c)(3). In defining "charitable" the Treasury Regu-
lations include activities such as:
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the under-privileged . • . erection or
maintenance of public buildings . . . lessening of the burdens of Government
. , promotion of social welfare . . . [and those helping] (i) to lessen neighbor-
hood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend
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welfare . . . ."68
 Additional prerequisites for the exemption are that
the organization's net earnings not inure, either wholly or partly; to
private individuals69
 and that they not be utilized to further nonexempt
purposes.7°
In order to determine whether an organization's activities qualify
for the exemption under these statutory provisions, the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) applies both organizational and operational tests. 71
The organizational test requires that the corporate purposes stated
in the charter be limited to those specified by the Code as exempt,"
and that the express powers of the corporation be restricted so as to
preclude corporate action in furtherance of nonexempt purposes, ex-
cept to an "insubstantial" degree." The operational test limits the
tax exemption to organizations engaged "primarily in activities which
accomplish . . . exempt purposes. . . ." 74
The relevant case law indicates that providing low-cost housing
and related services to low-income families is an exempt purpose when
a community interest is served and when government authorization,
assistance and participation are present. For example, in Scofield v.
Rio Farms," the Federal Farm Security Agency had helped to orga-
nize a corporation for the purpose of training; educating and housing
low-income farmers. In addition, the Agency had sold surplus federal
real estate to the corporation and had provided necessary guidance in
order to promote achievement of the program objectives. The corpo-
ration was granted an exemption because its function satisfied a public
need and because the extent of the Farm Security Agency's involve-
ment indicated a governmental commitment to the success of the proj-
ect. The importance of a finding of such governmental commitment
is illustrated in Commissioner v. Lake Forest, Inc.," where a corpo-
ration sponsoring the sale of a former federal defense housing project
to veterans was denied an exemption. The court reasoned that the
government had participated in the transaction only as a vendor, and
that no overriding public purpose was served in the sale of housing
to veterans." When measured against the guidelines set forth in these
human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deteriora-
tion and juvenile delinquency.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (2) (1971). The Regulations define "educational" as:
(a) The instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving
or developing his capabilities; or (b) The instruction of the public on subjects
useful to the individual and beneficial to the community.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1971).
68
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 501(c)(4).
69 Id. § 501(c) (3).
79 Id.	 501(c)(4).
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (1971).
72 Id. § I.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(a) (1971).
78 Id.	 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(b) (1971).
74 Id. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c)(1) (1971).
75 205 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1953).
76 305 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1962).
77 Id. at 818-19.
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cases, the paiticipation of a nonprofit corporation in a plan to provide
housing under federally-assisted programs presents a strong case for
exemption. The existence of a public purpose is evidenced by the sub-
stantial, long-term government commitment to the elimination of
blighted areas and the improvement of housing conditions. 78 Further-
more, extensive governmental involvement is found in the government's
participation in planning the project 'as well as in providing subsidies
for forty-year mortgage terms.79
Nonetheless, because the. corporation will be acting to achieve
the housing objectives from within a limited partnership form of as-
sociation, additional problems involving the corporation's exempt status
may arise. In particular, the corporation's involvement in a real estate
venture which generates benefits for profit-motivated investors might
result in a challenge to the exemption based on the contention that
these nonexempt purposes constitute more than an insubstantial por-
tion of the corporation's activities. However, in Garden Homes Co.
v. Commissioner," an exemption was granted to a corporation which,
with state and local government assistance, had organized, planned
and developed over one hundred homes for low-income families on a
nonprofit basis. The exemption was granted despite the fact that part
of the project's financing had -come from the sale of stock to private
investors who received dividends. The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals compared the dividends to interest payments, that is, the neces-
sary cost of obtaining capital needed in order to achieve the beneficial
social purpose of providing housing to needy families. 81 Thus the fact
that a housing project generates financial benefits for passive investors
has been held not to preclude exemption. In the context of the present
problem; one of the "costs" of obtaining capital for low-income hous-
ing is the benefit accruing to the partners. It follows that the genera-
tion of these benefits should not be reason to deny an exemption. The
fact that the nonprofit corporation's relationship with the limited
partners is found to constitute commercial activity should not, stand-
ing alone, bar an exemption; rather, such a finding should require the
nonprofit corporation to show that its primary purpose and activities
are exempt and that only an insubstantial portion of its activities re-
lates to the alleged commercial functions."
Although there are no cases or rulings which examine the exemp-
tion of a nonprofit corporation involved in a limited partnership, there
is case law concerning the question of the permissible commercial ac-
tivities of exempt corporations in general. In Trinidad v. Sagrada
Orden de Predicadores," the IRS alleged that a large, exempt religious
78
 Report of the President's Comm. on Urban Housing, A Decent Home 59-68 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as A Decent Home).
7' FHA Handbook 4442.1, Rental Housing for Lower Income Families 12 (1968).
8° 64 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1933).
81 Id. at 598.
82 Treas. Reg. 1$01(c) (3)-1(c) (1) (1971).
88 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
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and educational organization which managed a substantial endowment
fund was engaged in nonexempt activities because the organization
received 2.8 percent of its operating income from the commercial sale
of wine, chocolates and other articles. In holding the organization
exempt, the United States Supreme Court articulated a "destination
of income" test to determine the exemption status of organizations
involved in commercial activities. The Court indicated that the source
of the revenues from commercial activity was immaterial as long as
they were used in pursuit of an exempt purpose."
The destination of income test was used in a series of cases" to
justify an exemption where the income from commercial activity
amounted to considerably more than the 2.8 percent of operating in-
come involved in Sagrada. For example, in C. F. Mueller Co. v. Com-
missioner,86 a corporation was organized for the purpose of benefiting
New York University Law School, an exempt educational organiza-
tion. The corporation acquired ownership of a large manufacturer of
macaroni and other pasta products whose profits were paid to the law
school. The court applied the destination of income test and found the
corporation exempt."
The scope of the Sagrada doctrine was narrowed, however, in
People's Educational Camp Society v. Commissioner," where a camp,
founded as part of an exempt educational organization, had expanded
and continued as an exempt institution long after the founding orga-
nization had been dissolved. The camp controlled extensive recrea-
tional facilities and charged rates competitive with private nonexempt
resorts in the area. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Society was nonexempt on two grounds: first, that the Society com-
peted with private resort operators; and second, that there existed a
disproportionate relationship between expenditures claimed for the
educational and cultural exempt purposes on the one hand and the
total aggregation of income and other expenditures on the other."
The court noted that although the revenues of the Society were not
turned over to private persons, there was some question as to the
amount of social benefit the public received from the organization's
84 Id. at 581.
85 See C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), Boman v.
Commissioner, 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957), Lichter Foundation, Inc. v. Welch, 247 F.2d
431 (6th Cir, 1957).
86 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
• 87 Id. at 122. The 1969 Tax Reform Act added provisions to tax the unrelated
business income of exempt organizations in response to the Mueller-type situation. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 511-514. However, the nonprofit corporation in a limited partner-
ship should not be subject to the tax because of participation in a housing partnership, as
long as the corporation receives no distribution of partnership capital or assets. If the
corporation should receive developmental, organizational, or founders' fees from the
investors, these may be characterized as taxable, unrelated business income.
88 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964).
89 Id. at 931.
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activities." The court examined the Society's accumulation of funds
and allocation of revenue to capital expansion which, in turn, gen-
erated more revenue and stated that "where .. . so much of [an
organization's] revenues are devoted to expanding its commercial fa-
cilities and *increasing its surpluses, and so little . . . is spent for social
welfare activities, that it is actually clear that the primary purpose
of the organization is not really the promotion of social welfare but
the running of a commercial operation," no exemption would issue."
It is submitted that a nonprofit corporation engaged in a local
limited partnership clearly meets the destination of income test of
Sagrada. When all revenues are used to provide tenant services and
facilities and to meet other project expenses and, as Garden Homes
indicated, if the payment of some of the rental income to the limited
partners is considered such an expense, the "destination" of the rev-
enue must necessarily be viewed as part of a tax exempt purpose. The
situation in People's Camp is clearly distinguishable from the activities
of the nonprofit general partner involved in a housing limited partner-
ship. In that case the principal activity of the Society was the opera-
tion of a recreational resort facility, and a comparatively small amount
of the Society's activities were devoted to charitable, educational and
social welfare causes. This situation contrasts sharply with the activi-
ties of a nonprofit corporation in a local limited partnership; where
nearly all of the corporate functions involve providing safe, decent
and sanitary housing to low-income families at subsidized rates. Only
incidentally do the activities of the corporation financially benefit the
profit-motivated investors. The latter's participation is merely a source
of capital for achieving the social welfare purposes of the nonprofit
corporation, by facilitating the financing of low-cost housing.
A challenge by the IRS, based on the People's Camp theory of
impermissible competition with private, profit-making developers would
be unjustifiable since the latter receive sizable tax subsidies as induce-
ment for their investment and participation.° 2 It would certainly be
inconsistent to deprive the nonprofit general partner, responsible for
the actual project management and provision of services, of his exemp-
tion when his income will be used to further the declared national
goal of a decent home for every American family." Thus the ac-
tivities of a nonprofit corporation involved in a housing partnership
seem to fall within the boundaries for exemption expressed in People's
Camp. To deny exemption to such a corporation would require a far
narrower interpretation of acceptable commercial activities than the
decision in People's Camp indicates.
00 Id. at 932.
91
 Id. at 933.
02 See note 18 supra. The same tax benefits are available to profit-motivated sponsors
even without the involvement of a nonprofit corporation.
02 42	 § 1441 (1971).
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III. FEDERAL INCOME TAX CLASSIFICATION
The third important consideration in determining the feasibility
of using a local limited partnership having a nonprofit corporate gen-
eral partner to develop low- and moderate-income housing is whether
the local partnership will be classified for federal tax purposes as a
partnership, rather than as an "association taxable as a corporation.""
If the partnership is taxed as a corporation, it will be unable to "pass
through" the accelerated depreciation benefits to the investors; the
attractiveness of the investment will therefore be diminished. While
this problem was settled for the NHP by the 1968 Housing Act," the
problem remains unresolved for the purely local partnership.
In order to receive a partnership classification, the limited part-
nership must show both that it more closely resembles a partnership
than a corporation," and that the general partner is adequately capi-
talized." To determine whether the first of these requirements has
been met, the Treasury Regulations set forth a "resemblance test."
This test involves an analysis of an organization with respect to six
corporate characteristics: (1) the existence of associates; (2) the
objective of carrying on a business and dividing the gains therefrom;
(3) the continuity of the organization's "life"; (4) the centralization
of management; (5) the limitation on liability and (6) the free trans-
ferability of interests." Because the first two characteristics are shared
by both partnerships and corporations; they are considered irrelevant
to the classification procedure." Thus the four remaining characteris-
tics are used to determine the classification.'" If a limited partnership
is found to possess three or more of these characteristics, it will be
considered a corporation for tax purposes and it will not obtain the
pass-through tax advantages.'" It is therefore important to understand
precisely each of the four characteristics which the IRS uses in making
its determination:
(1) Continuity of Life.--This characteristic refers to an organi-
zational identity which is not dissolved under local law by the death,
insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation or expulsion of any mem-
ber.'" "Dissolution" in this context means "an alteration of the iden-
tity of an organization by reason of a change in the relationship be-
94
 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (1971).
95
 See A Decent Home, supra note 78, at 86.
96
 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1971).
27
 Rev. Proc. 72-13, I.R.B. 1972-2, published on January 10, 1972, sets forth minimum
net worth requirements that a corporation which is the sole general partner of a limited
partnership must meet before the IRS will consider advance rulings concerning classifica-
tion of this type of organization as a partnership for tax purposes. See discussion at pp.
930-32 infra.
98 Treas. Reg.	 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1971).
99
 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1971).
100 Id.
101 Id. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1971).
102 Id.	 301.7701-2(b)(1),(2) (1971).
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tween its members as determined under local law." 1°8 A corporation
possesses this attribute since its existence is not affected by the with-
drawal of a shareholder. The corporate charter, not the continued
involvement of the owners, determines the term of corporate life. Upon
death, the shares owned by a corporate shareholder pass to his suc-
cessors as does his other personal property. If he transfers his shares,
the transferee succeeds to his interest.'" Thus a corporation has a
"continuing identity which is detached from the relationship between
its stockholders" and a continued existence which is unaffected by
the withdrawal of its members. 1°5
A limited partnership, organized under the ULPA, differs from
this corporate model in several respects. A partnership, unlike a cor-
poration, is not an independent legal person; but rather is an associa-
tion of persons which requires continued membership in order to
preserve its organizational identity. Thus, under the ULPA, a part-
nership is dissolved upon the death or withdrawal of a partner; 103
and, even where the business may be continued by the remaining mem-
bers of the partnership,'" the power of a partner under local law to
dissolve the partnership will be sufficient to prevent the finding of
continuity of life.'" For this reason the Treasury Regulations indicate
that a limited partnership organized under a statute corresponding
to the ULPA will be found to lack continuity of life."' The same
result obtains even where the general partner is a nonprofit corpora-
tion. Although corporations do not die, retire or lose capacity, they
may withdraw from the partnership,"° dissolve,'' or go into bank-
ruptcy.'"Thus, if the limited partnership were organized under the
ULPA and the agreement provided that in the event of the withdrawal,
dissolution or bankruptcy of the corporate general partner the part-
nership would be dissolved, the limited partnership would be found
to lack continuity of life 113
(2) Centralization of Management.—This characteristic is defined
as the "concentration of continuing exclusive authority to make inde-
pendent business decisions on behalf of the organization which do not
require ratification by members of such organization;"1" The paradigm
of an association having centralized management is the corporation. In
the corporate form of conducting business, a board of directors is
108 Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1971).
104
 H. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations 3 (1946).
108 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1971).
100 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §§ 9, 10; Uniform Partnership Act § .31.
1°T Uniform Partnership Act § 20.
108 Treas. Reg. {1§ 301.7701-2(b)(2),(3) (1971).
109 Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1971).
110 Uniform Limited Partnership Act 9(1), Uniform Partnership Act § 31(1)(b).
111 ABA-ALI Model Nonprofit Corporation Act § 51 (1964 ed.).
112 11 U.S.C. § 23(i) (1970). If all general partners are adjudged bankrupt, the
partnership is bankrupt.
118 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1971).
114 Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (1971).
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elected to represent the interests of the shareholders and to manage
the business on their behalf."' Elected management; however, is but
one form of centralized management. Another is presented by a lim-
ited partnership, where the general partners conduct the business for
both themselves and the limited partners. Even though this is a situa-
tion in which management is centered in less than all of the owners,
it will not be considered "centralized" for tax purposes if the general
partners have a significant interest in the partnership."' The apparent
rationale for this rule is that where the general partners have a sub-
stantial interest, they will be managing on their own behalf and in
furtherance of their own interests.'"
The question of whether a general partner has sufficient interest in
the partnership to warrant a finding of noncentralized management
depends upon the relative interests of the general and limited partners.
The question of substantiality thus depends upon the percentage of
capital contributed by the general partners, and not merely on the
amount contributed. Although the Treasury has not established a figure
by which to determine the substantiality requirement, the Regulations
provide that, where the limited partners contribute $5,000,000, and the
general partners $300,000 (six percent of the total amount contrib-
uted), the general partners' contribution, while substantial in the abso-
lute sense, is insubstantial when compared to the contribution of the
limited partners."' The Regulations are silent on the question of how
much capital beyond the six percent level would be necessary to estab-
lish substantiality; however, the leading case construing the tax classi-
fication of limited partnerships held that no centralized management
existed where the general partners had contributed forty-two percent
of the total capital."'" Thus the minimum capital contribution needed
to meet the requirement of substantiality appears to lie somewhere
between six and forty-two percent of the total contributed.
The foregoing guidelines do not appear to be onerous. Where the
limited partnership is engaged in the development of low- and mod-
erate-income housing, the total capital contribution of both the non-
profit general partner and the limited partners can be expected to be
minimal, since the partnership; as a limited dividend sponsor, would
be eligible for an FHA insured mortgage covering ninety percent of the
development costs.'" If, for example, the total development cost were
$1,000,000, the limited partnership would be eligible for a ninety per-
cent mortgage ($900,000), and would be required to contribute only a
ten percent equity ($100,000). If six percent of the total is an unac-
ceptable minimum to constitute a substantial interest and forty-two
115 H. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations 122 (1946).
116 Treas. Reg. g 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1971).
117 Id.
118 Id. 301.7701-3(b) (2) (Example 1) (1971).
110 Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 E.T.A. 176 (1942).
120 24 C.F.R.	 221.514(a)(2)(ii), 236.10(c) (1968).
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percent meets the requirement, then a contribution by the nonprofit
corporation of an amount between $6,000 and $42,000 would be nec-
essary to avoid a finding of centralization of management. If it is
remembered that the corporation will have control of a $1,000,000
development, such a contribution constitutes a reasonable capital re-
quirement. Even an undercapitalized nonprofit corporation would or-
dinarily be able to make a sufficient contribution to qualify as the
owner of a substantial interest in the partnership and thereby avoid
a finding of centralization of management. However, even if the non-
profit corporation were undercapitalized to the extent that it would
fail to contribute sufficient capital in order to avoid the centralization
of management standard, this failure ,by itself would not cause the lim-
ited partnership to be classified as a corporation under the "resem-
blance test." As noted previously, a limited partnership must be found
to possess three or more corporate characteristics before it will be
held to have failed the test.
(3) Limited Liability.
—Limited liability exists in a business asso-
ciation when no member is personally liable for the debts of the orga-
nization, except to the extent of his investment. 121
 This limitation on
liability is, of course, one of the primary advantages of doing business
in the corporate form. In a limited partnership, the limited partners
enjoy a similar limitation on liability. 122
 However, the general partner
has unlimited personal liability for partnership debts in the event
partnership assets are insufficient to meet creditors' clairns. 128
 Thus,
while the limited partners enjoy a form of limited liability similar to
that of a corporate stockholder, the general partner possesses the per-
sonal liability necessary to avoid a finding that the organization has
the limited liability characteristic of a corporation.
A somewhat different situation is presented where the only general
partner in a partnership is a corporation. Here the rule is that the
partnership has no limited liability when the corporation has "substan-
tial assets" outside the partnership. 124
 The reason for this rule is that,
in a situation where the sole general partner is a corporation having no
assets outside the partnership, creditors would be able to look only to
the partnership's assets for satisfaction. 125
 In this situation; a de facto
limit on liability identical to that of corporate limited liability would
exist. As in a corporate veil situation, the limited partnership form
would permit limited partners to use an undercapitalized corporate
general partner as a device for avoiding creditors' claims. By requiring
the corporate general partner to possess substantial assets outside the
partnership, the IRS has made it less desirable for limited partners to
use a "dummy" corporation for the purpose of avoiding liability.
121 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1971).
122
 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §t 1, 17(1).
122
 Id. § 9(1), Uniform Partnership Act § 15.
124 Treas. Reg. D 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1971).
125 Id.
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The purpose behind the "substantial assets outside the partner-
ship" requirement is broader than merely to provide a cushion for
creditors' claims, however; where it is shown that the general partner
is not a "dummy" corporation, personal liability will exist for tax pur-
poses even though the corporation does not own substantial assets out-
side the partnership."' Hence the avoidance of limited partner control
over the general partner seems to be of more importance than the avail-
ability of sufficient assets to satisfy creditors' claims. A limited partner-
ship will thus avoid the characteristic of corporate limited liability by
demonstrating that the general partner owns substantial assets outside
the partnership, or by showing that the corporate general partner is
not a dummy acting as the agent of the limited partners.'
(4) Free Transferability of Interests.
—An organization will be
found to have this characteristic for tax purposes when the owner of an
interest in the organization possesses the power to substitute a non-
member for himself without obtaining the consent of the remaining
members."' In a corporation, the interests of the investors are usually
freely transferable."" Limited partnership interests, on the other hand,
are not; "° a partnership is a carefully controlled, private membership
organization."' A limited partnership organized under the ULPA does
not normally have free transferability of interests. The ULPA permits
a limited partner to substitute an assignee only when authorized by the
partnership agreement, or with the consent of all members of the
partnership.'" If a partnership agreement governed by the ULPA re-
quires consent of all members before an assignee can become a substi-
tuted partner, the partnership interests will not be considered freely
transferable for tax purposes.
The foregoing analysis of the "resemblance test" indicates that,
with proper attention to the formation of the partnership, limited
partnerships organized under the ULPA may avoid the three or more
corporate characteristics which would result in their being taxed as
corporations. This conclusion finds support in the judicial construction
given to the resemblance test in Glensder Textile Co. v. Commis-
sioner,'" the leading case construing the test. In Glensder, the Tax
Court, examining an IRS classification decision, applied the resem-
blance test to the following fact situation. The Glensder Textile Co.
was a general partnership which had dissolved and reorganized under
the New York Uniform Limited Partnership Act."'" In dissolving and
reorganizing, the four partners of the old partnership had allocated the
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1971).
129 H. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations 736 (1946).
180 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 19.
181 H. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations 7-8 (1946).
182 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 19(4).
188 46 B.TA. 176 (1942).
184 N.Y. Partnership Law § 90-119 (McKinney 1948).
928
HOUSING AND LOCAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
$300,000 net worth of the old partnership in the ratio of 5/12ths
($125,000) to themselves as general partners and 7/12ths ($175,000)
to their wives and children as limited partners in a new, limited part-
nership. The profits of the new association were to be distributed in
the same ratio as the capital contributed. The limited partnership
agreement provided that, upon the death, retirement or insanity of one
or more of the general partners, the remaining general partners had the
right to continue the business. The agreement further provided that the
limited partners could assign their interests and could confer upon
assignees the rights of a substituted limited partner.
The IRS contended that the limited partnership more closely
resembled a corporation. The Tax Court disagreed, concluding that
the partnership lacked the necessary characteristics under the resem-
blance test.'" The court found that the partnership lacked "continuity
of life" in the corporate sense. Although the general partners had the
right to continue the business in the event of the death, retirement or
insanity of one or more partners, this continuity was unlike that of a
corporation, where the organization continues "regardless of the death
or resignation of its directors or stockholders."'" The court noted that
the partnership could continue but there was no assurance that it
would. Furthermore, the court determined that even if the remaining
partners chose to continue, a new partnership would, in effect, result.'"
This decision goes beyond the criteria of the Regulations to find a lack
of corporate continuity of life. The Regulations seemingly indicate
that, in order to avoid a finding of continuity of life, the partnership
agreement must require either that the business cannot be continued or
that it can be continued only with the consent of the remaining
partners.'" Nevertheless, the Tax Court concluded, in effect, that a
limited partnership cannot have corporate continuity because the con-
tinuation of the business will always be contingent upon a decision of
the remaining partners. Since the IRS acquiesced in this decision,'"
it would appear that ULPA limited partnerships will not be found to
have continuity of life.
With regard to the corporate attribute of centralized management,
the court ruled that the centralized control of the business by the
general partners was not analogous to corporate centralization of man-
agement. The court distinguished the control exercised by the general
partners from corporate management on two grounds. First, the general
partners, unlike corporate managers, could not be removed by the
nonmanaging owners—i.e., the limited partners."' Second, the general
partners, as owners of 5/12ths of the partnership interests, were man-
186 46 B.T.A. at 186-87.
186 Id. at 185.
187
 Id.
188 Treas. Reg. § 301.7741-2(b)(1) (1971).
139 1942-1 Cum. HU 8.
140 46 B.T.A. 176, 185 (1942).
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aging in furtherance of their own proprietary interests rather than as
mere representatives of the limited partners."' Moreover, with regard
to corporate limited liability, the court determined that it did not exist
in the partnership because, although the limited partners had limited
liability, the general partners had personal liability under the New York
Uniform Limited Partnership Act."' In examining the transferability of
interests, the court found that the partnership agreement permitted the
limited partners to assign their interests and to substitute other limited
partners; but since there were no ownership certificates, a practical
barrier to transfer existed." 3 The court therefore concluded that no
free transferability of interests existed, and held that the limited
partnership possessed none of the four corporate characteristics.
The decision in Glensder demonstrates a judicial willingness to
find that the relationship among the members of a limited partnership
is different from that among corporate owners. In particular, the court's
treatment of the continuity of life and transferability of interest char-
acteristics indicates a reluctance to view a limited partnership as a
corporation, despite a strong similarity between the two forms. Thus
the Tax Court revealed an inclination to apply standards of construc-
tion more favorable to partnership classification than the standards
provided in the Treasury Regulations. The acquiescence of the IRS in
the decision indicates that the Service is willing to follow the Glensder
view, and that there is little likelihood that a limited partnership con-
forming to the ULPA will be classified as a corporation for federal tax
purposes.
Nonetheless, in addition to the requirements of the "resemblance
test," the Individual Income Tax Rulings Branch of the IRS has im-
posed an additional requirement on a limited partnership which must
be met in order for it to receive a ruling of partnership tax classifica-
tion—the so-called "net worth test." This test, which is not included
in either the Code or the published Regulations, consists of several
guidelines which the Rulings Branch uses in addition to the resem-
blance test in order to determine a limited partnership's tax classifica-
tion.'" The net worth test requires that, before a limited partnership
may be ruled taxable as a partnership, if the total contributed capital
of the partnership is $2,500,000 or less, the corporate general partner
141 Id.
142 N.Y. Partnership Law f§ 90-119 (McKinney 1948).
148 46 B.TA. 176, 186 (1942).
144
 NHP Associates Operations Guide IX, at 6 (1971).
These guidelines, used in recent rulings decisions, were published in Rev. Proc. 72-13,
I.R.B. 1972-2, which applies only to a limited partnership with a sole corporate general
partner. See note 97 supra. This test differs from that articulated in the NHP Associates
Operations Guide in one respect. The latter indicates that in determining the corporation's
net worth, the IRS included the corporation's interest in the partnership, when it was
not the corporation's only asset, while Rev. Proc. 72-13 indicates that "[i)n computing
the net worth of the corporate general partner • . its interest in the limited partnership
and accounts and notes receivable from and payable to the limited partnership will be
excluded."
930
HOUSING AND LOCAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
must have a net worth equal to fifteen percent of the total contributions
to the partnership or $2 50,000, whichever is less; if the partnership's
contributed capital exceeds $2,500,000; the corporate general partner
must have a net worth equal to ten percent of the contributed
capital."' In determining the net worth of the corporate general part-
ner, the following guidelines are to be used: (1) its assets may be cal-
culated on the basis of appraised rather than book value, while its
liabilities must be calculated at book value; (2) its interest in the
partnership is excluded as an asset, unless the corporation is not the
only general partner and its interest in the partnership is not the
corporation's only asset; and (3) where there are two general partners,
the test will be applied to their combined net worth."'
The purpose of the net worth test apparently is to prevent the
creation of a de facto limit on liability through the use of an under-
capitalized general partner. This purpose is achieved by denying the
limited partnership a favorable tax classification if the corporate gen-
eral partner's net worth does not meet the standards of the test. Where
a corporation is the only general partner, its net worth is measured by
its assets outside the partnership. Thus, under the net worth test, the
amount of these assets is crucial to a favorable tax classification, where-
as, under the resemblance test, the measure of these assets is relevant
only to the limited liability characteristic."' Where there are two or
more general partners, the corporation's net worth includes its interest
in the partnership if the corporation also has assets outside the partner-
ship. In this situation, the total amount of corporate assets is de-
terminative of a favorable tax ruling. This amount relates to the charac-
teristics of limited liability and centralization of management,'" neither
of which, separately or in combination, determines the tax classification
under the resemblance test. While the precise relationship between the
net worth and resemblance tests will depend upon the financial structure
of individual corporations, it seems clear that the Rulings Branch has
made satisfaction of the net worth test the sine qua non for partnership
classification.
To return to the earlier example of a $1,000,000 project having
$100,000 of contributed capital; in this situation the net worth test
would be met if the nonprofit corporation had a net worth, excluding
its interest in the partnership, of $15,000. Although certainly not
an unreasonable amount, the result under the net worth test may not
comport with the result under the traditional resemblance test stan-
dard. For example, assume that a corporation has a $10,000 interest
in a partnership as a result of its contribution to capital, and that it
owns $4,000 in assets outside the partnership. Under these facts, the
145 Id. at 6-7; Rev. Proc. 72-13, I.R.B. 1972-2.
140 NHP Associates Operations Guide § IX, at 7 (1971), as modified by Rev. Proc.
72-13, I.R.B. 1972-2. See note 144, supra.
147 See discussion at pp. 927-28 supra.
148 See discussion at p. 926 supra.
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corporation would not satisfy the $15,000 minimum requirement of the
net worth test and the partnership would not receive a favorable IRS
ruling. However; even assuming that neither the corporation's $10,000
interest in the partnership nor its $4,000 in assets outside the partner-
ship would be considered "substantial," the resemblance test would not
require that the partnership be ruled taxable as a corporation. Accord-
ing to the Regulations, the lack of substantial assets outside the part-
nership would affect only the corporate characteristic of limited
liability,'" and even this fact could be dismissed upon a showing that
the corporate general partner was not merely a "dummy" acting as the
limited partners' agent.'" Furthermore, a general partner's lack of
substantial interest in the partnership would affect only the centraliza-
tion of management characteristic."' Under the long-standing resem-
blance test these criteria alone would not be determinative of corporate
tax classification, since three corporate characteristics must be met
before an association may be taxed as a corporation. 152
It is not clear why the IRS has given the net worth test pre-
eminence over the criteria enumerated by the Regulations. Nonetheless,
because it is applied, the net worth test may discourage use of the
limited partnership form. Those participants who meet the resemblance
test standards but who do not meet the standards of the net worth test
will clearly be discouraged from using the limited partnership device.
Further, the uncertainty of the present standard may discourage at-.
torneys, who may feel that the area is in a state of flux, from recom-
mending use of the device at this time.
If the net worth test is retained, a nonprofit corporation with
insufficient net worth may still participate in limited partnerships in
two ways. First; the nonprofit corporation may And it helpful to include
additional, nonmanaging general partners in order to increase the total
net worth of the general partners' interests. Second, the limited part-
nership may seek a waiver of the net worth requirement. The net worth
requirement may be waived when additional factors exist, such as the
participation of a "deserving minority builder, developer or community
group, and the project is otherwise sound as well as desirable."'" Thus
even the net worth requirement may not be an insurmountable obstacle.
However, such additional factors serve to make the net worth require-
ment even more speculative and to support the position that the net
worth test should offer more definitive guidelines upon which potential
sponsors of housing may base important planning decisions. The dif-
ficulty posed by the net worth test lies less in its substantive require-
ments than in its form and in the apparent contradiction of the Regula-
tions.
149 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1971).
150 Id.
151 Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1971).
152 Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1971).
153 Nip Associates Operations Guide § IX, at 8 (1971). Rev. Proc. 72-13 makes no
mention of a waiver of the net worth requirement.
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The limited partnership form could be a fruitful resource for ful-
filling the national goal of a decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment for every American family. This form of business association
attracts private capital to the low- and moderate-income housing
market through the combination of federal tax benefits, insulation from
the claims of creditors and freedom from the responsibilities of project
management. The involvement of non-profit corporations as managing
general partners could further provide increased social services, train-
ing, and community facilities within a housing project in order to
achieve a fuller complement of life-enriching services for the tenants.
In establishing a mechanism capable of providing these services with-
out the involvement of the NHP, the local housing partnership is
subject to certain organizational questions which were resolved for
NHP but not for the purely local partnership. These are (1) the power
of a nonprofit corporation to serve as a partner; (2) the availability of
a federal income tax exemption to a nonprofit corporation which joins
such a partnership; and (3) the federal income tax classification of the
partnership.
In many jurisdictions, the traditional common law prohibition
against corporate participation in partnerships has been either judi-
cially eroded or legislatively abrogated. The legislative willingness to
permit corporate participation in partnerships is manifest in Massachu-
setts and in those jurisdictions which have adopted the relevant section
of the ABA-ALI Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, wherein nonprofit
corporations receive express authorization to join partnerships. Al-
though there have been no cases or rulings by the Internal Revenue
Service regarding the question of a tax exemption for a nonprofit cor-
porate partner sponsoring housing through a local limited partnership,
strong arguments can be made for such an exemption. The activities
of the corporation in providing housing and related services to needy
persons on a nonprofit basis seem to meet the requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations.
Further, it appears that a local housing partnership organized un-
der the Uniform Limited Partnership Act will not be classified as a cor-
poration for tax purposes under the four criteria of the Treasury's
"resemblance test," since a limited partnership does not conform to
the corporate model used as the standard for the test. The major
obstacle in organizing the partnership seems to be the procedural "net
worth test" used by the IRS Rulings Branch. This test appears to
obfuscate the resemblance test established in the Treasury Regula-
tions; it also serves to reduce the efficacy of the tax incentive device
because the tax classification determines whether the depreciation
benefits "pass through" to investors. However, the net worth require-
ment does not appear to be an insurmountable obstacle. As noted, since
the total capital investment required of the partnership in a federally-
subsidized housing project is fairly modest, the nonprofit corporation
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having relatively little capital may nevertheless be able to join a local
housing partnership. Thus it appears that the various problems of
organization surrounding the local limited partnership may be resolved
with little difficulty. The increased participation of nonprofit corporate
general partners in such partnerships may provide an answer to the
nation's urgent need for additional low- and moderate-income housing.
PAUL F. McDorroucH
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